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Abstract 
The economic crisis has revived the interest on the increasingly vulnerable position of youth in the labour 
market. In this paper we analyze flexicurity policies in the Nordic and in Southern European countries in the 
period previous to the crisis and explore whether they contribute to explain this trend and differences across 
countries. First of all, it is argued how the disadvantaged position of this group in the labour market has 
long-running causes and is not just the consequence of deterioration in labour market conditions as a result 
of the crisis. Labour market policies under the flexicurity umbrella haven’t been able to mitigate the 
increasing dualization of many EU labour markets. This also applies to young workers that are more 
exposed to the flexibility envisaged under this paradigm and in many countries less protected by the 
compensating security measures. However, the analysis shows how the crisis is widening the gap between 
countries in the degree and form of uncertainty facing young workers. Those in countries with labour market 
policies closer to the flexicurity paradigm perform better before and after the crisis compared to countries 
with institutional configurations far from the flexicurity ideal-type. It is finally argued how record youth 
unemployment jeopardises the sustainability of welfare state arrangements across European Social models 
and poses serious challenges to social cohesion. 
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Introduction 
Young workers are facing hard times in European labour markets. They not only are 
experiencing increasing difficulties in their school-to-work transitions, but their second transition in 
their working lives, i.e., from unstable and very often precarious jobs towards more stable indefinite 
positions is also becoming longer and more uncertain. High unemployment, low employment rates 
and insecure working conditions often characterise their early steps in the labour market. The 
present crisis has further worsened this situation, though there remain remarkable differences across 
EU member states (Bell and Blanchflower 2011). It has been widely recognised how the 
introduction of flexibility has had an asymmetric effect on certain groups such as young workers, 
women or immigrant workers who suffer from higher levels of uncertainty in their labour market 
trajectories. Strategies followed by some EU governments to introduce flexibility at the margins 
have delivered an increasing segmentation of labour markets where the abovementioned groups of 
workers tend to occupy the lower segments and are exposed to more risks than other protected 
groups. 
Paradoxically, even though flexicurity policies were aimed precisely at limiting the negative 
impact of flexibility by introducing certain guarantees and forms of protection for those groups in a 
particularly disadvantaged position, young workers remain overexposed to the risks of 
unemployment, low pay, temporary jobs etc. This is due to the fact that in segmented labour 
markets, young workers are asymmetrically affected by flexicurity policies. On the one hand, they 
suffer from higher degrees of flexibility in the initial stages of their labour markets careers as the 
two components of flexicurity policies have different impacts upon different groups of population. 
Even though the essence of flexicurity policies lies precisely in the need to increase flexibility of 
protected groups in the labour market whilst enhancing security for the unprotected, the outcomes 
of flexicurity policies exhibit a high degree of disparity and deviations with respect to the expected 
pattern. Moreover, security measures aimed at compensating for the increasing risks and uncertainty 
triggered by labour market flexibility may also have a differential impact depending on the group of 
employees. More specifically, due to the employment conditions affecting young workers, we can 
expect lower levels of protection due to the difficulties to contribute sufficiently in order to have 
right to unemployment benefits. On the other hand, we can also expect that in the present 
conditions, the weaker groups in the labour market are those hit harder by the economic crisis.. As a 
matter of fact, many authors have argued about the little counter-cyclical character of flexicurity 
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policies, which haven’t contributed much to improving the conditions of workers more exposed to 
the increasing uncertainty of the crisis. 
The consequence of the youth-blindness of flexicurity policies is some kind of inter-
temporal unbalanced distribution of flexibility and security rather than a balancing out of flexibility 
and security for all age cohorts. In the initial stages of their labour market careers, young workers 
are particularly exposed to risks associated with atypical jobs and difficulties to get an indefinite 
contract. The implications of atypicality for the uncertainty facing young workers varies depending 
on the set of policies designed in order to provide security. This uncertainty ceases once they obtain 
a stable job and enter the protected segment of the labour market. However, the form and timing of 
this second transition varies greatly among countries, as we will see below.  
This paper analyzes the position of young workers in labour markets in relation to the 
uncertainty they face and how institutional arrangements related to flexicurity contribute to alleviate 
or increase this uncertainty. Three main questions are addressed. First, which is the situation and 
how are labour market transitions of young workers in Nordic and Mediterranean countries? 
Secondly, how can different situations of young workers be attributed to different flexicurity 
arrangements in the two country clusters? In other words, do different forms of implementing 
flexicurity policies have a different impact upon the situation of young workers? Finally, has the 
crisis significantly deteriorated the position of young workers? The term “different situations” refers 
both to patterns with respect to the entry of young persons into employment (e.g. the role of 
temporary employment) as well as to different forms of segmentation (e.g. between insiders and 
outsiders) that young persons face in the labour market.  
A broad analytical approach is necessary since youth unemployment is a complex socio-
economic phenomenon whose determinants go far beyond labour market policies. However, given 
the characteristics of this paper, the focus will be on the effect of flexicurity. In order to do so, we 
explore mobility patterns for this group and in particular, and how exposed they are to non-
employment and precarious employment. The final aim of the paper is to shed some light into the 
concept of sustainable security, as we think it is particularly important for young workers to find 
ways of guaranteeing certain levels of protection in the labour market without this translating into 
more insecure arrangements in the early stages of young labour market trajectories. Focus is not on 
the EU as a whole, but on two clusters of countries that are often considered to be most different 
cases, namely the Nordic countries and the Mediterranean countries, which albeit their internal 
differences are still seen to constitute very different labour market models embedded in different 
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welfare state models. The selection of cases will allow us not only to understand differences and 
similarities between countries belonging to different clusters, but also to understand within cluster 
differences and their institutional determinants. At the same, the use of data covering both the pre-
crisis and crisis period will allow us to test the capacity of flexicurity institutions under very 
different economic contexts. 
The paper is organized in three sections. Section I reviews the existing debates about 
flexicurity at the light of the concepts of uncertainty and sustainable security. Section II then moves 
into the analysis of youth performance in the labour market under the crisis. It provides descriptive 
evidence about the labour market situation of young workers during the crisis as well as the 
incidence of atypical forms of employment. Section III then moves into the analysis of labour 
market transitions and in particular, what role does age play. Section IV concludes. 
 
 
Section I 
Flexicurity and the (unequal) distribution of labour market uncertainty  
Flexicurity has become an increasingly contested concept and policy paradigm. Several 
authors have recently pointed out to the elusive character of a term that is used by policy makers in 
order to justify very different and often contradictory policies (Burroni and Keune 2011; Keune and 
Pochet 2009). The strength of a paradigm claiming the possibility to consolidate positive sum 
employment policies has revealed some major weaknesses and is being attacked by both trade 
unions and employers. Whilst the former claim that under the catchword of flexicurity, 
governments have implemented an agenda focused almost exclusively on the flexi part of it, 
employers argue that very rarely has flexicurity worked as expected because the virtuous balance 
envisaged on paper is very difficult to achieve under the institutional and regulatory framework that 
exists in many EU countries. 
 Three of the critiques recently made to the concept are particularly relevant for the sake of 
this paper. The first has to do with the structural effectiveness of flexicurity to reduce dualization 
(segmentation). The second has to do with the way in which flexicurity policies have been able to 
cope with the effects of the economic crisis. Finally, the third is related to the need to go beyond a 
narrow flexicurity-approach and consider a wider array of policies.  
In its original formulation, flexicurity policies were aimed at limiting the negative 
consequences caused especially by external flexibility in terms of precariousness for some workers. 
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One of the few agreements regarding the effects of introducing greater flexibility in the labour 
market is that it has had an asymmetric on different groups. Regardless of the type of flexibility we 
look at, it is generally accepted that some groups have been increasingly exposed to more risks as a 
consequence of changes in labour market regulation. This would be particularly the case of women, 
youth and immigrants. This outcome is at odds with the original formulation that established the 
need to enhance security of workers more exposed to forms of flexibility. However, the reality is 
that in many countries some groups have been disproportionately affected by flexibility whilst other 
workers have enhanced their already secure position, hence reinforcing the ongoing dualizing 
trends. 
The impact of the economic crisis has led some scholars to study the effectiveness of 
flexicurity arrangements in the new context. Hence, whilst some authors have argued how 
flexicurity hasn’t worked in a context of economic crisis and recession (Tangian 2011) others think 
that it is necessary to pay more attention to internal flexibility complemented with public assistance 
(Council of the European Union 2009). However, paying more attention to internal flexibility is no 
guarantee of greater protection for some particularly vulnerable groups like now young workers 
unless external flexibility is reduced. Otherwise, youth would still be overexposed to temporary 
employment and companies would still rely upon this form of flexibility for this group, hence using 
internal flexibility with public assistance for core workers. Heyes (2011) shows how the impact of 
the economic crisis on employment in many cases has been larger in those countries with lower 
EPL compared to countries with more protective EPL. In other words, the labour market impact of 
the crisis has been lower in countries with more robust employment protection systems. 
 The second aspect worth mentioning is the effectiveness of flexicurity policies during the 
economic crisis. Some authors have argued that flexicurity policies have only worked in a context 
of growing employment and availability of public resources devoted to funding active labour 
market policies (Tangian 2011; Eurofound 2012). As a result of the economic crisis, some countries 
have significantly reduced the already low quantities devoted to funding ALMP or have maintained 
them in a context of growing unemployment. Provided the importance of this instrument within the 
original flexicurity building, its paralysis undermines core elements of the paradigm.  
 Without denying the importance of ALMP and the need to increase financial efforts to 
increase its scope and enhance its quality, it is necessary to adopt a broader approach which not 
only takes into account the implementation of flexicurity policies, but integrates them with other 
policies which may contribute to improve the position of young workers. The uncertainty facing 
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young workers in the labour market is exacerbated by conditions and regulations in other policies 
like now housing.  
 
Section II 
Hardly New, but Worrying Anyway: Youth in the Labour Market during the Crisis 
A debate has emerged in recent months and is rapidly growing around the need to pay 
greater attention to young workers and youth unemployment. This claim is supported  by evidence 
of a stronger impact of the present crisis on youth unemployment compared to the early 1990s’ 
crisis. This has particularly been the case for some countries, most notably Southern European, 
compared to continental and Nordic countries, where youth unemployment grew to a similar extent 
as in the early 1990s crisis. In Southern Europe, the effect of the last crisis on youth unemployment 
has been particularly strong compared to the evolution in the early 1990s’ years (Eurofound 2012).   
Against this view, other authors claim that there is nothing new in the fact that youth 
unemployment has gone up very rapidly, as a high youth unemployment rate has become an 
entrenched characteristic of European labour markets. As a matter of fact, when we compare youth 
unemployment rates right before the crisis with the total unemployment rate for all countries 
considered in this paper we observe how there has hardly been any deterioration in the relative 
performance of young workers. Rather the contrary, with the exception of Finland, there has been 
an improvement in the relative performance of youth unemployment rate compared to the overall 
unemployment rate (see table 1).  
 
Table 1: Ratio of Unemployment Rate for those aged 15-24 and total Unemployment Rate 
 2007 2010 
European Union (27 countries) 2,2 2,2 
   
Greece 2,7 2,6 
Spain 2,2 2,1 
Italy 3,3 3,3 
Portugal 2,0 2,0 
   
Denmark 2,1 1,8 
Finland 2,4 2,5 
Sweden 3,1 2,9 
Norway 3,0 2,6 
Source: Eurostat, EULFS 
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At the light of the above, one could be tempted to argue that there is an unjustified alarm 
about youth labour market performance as previous crises have witnessed similar situations. 
However, the most important changes in the position of youth in the labour market can’t be 
perceived by using purely quantitative indicators of unemployment. When we go deeper into the 
characteristics of unemployment we do observe some significant transformations. Thus a look into 
youth long-term unemployment shows how the crisis has led to a general increase, with the only 
exception of Greece. It is interesting to note that youth long-term unemployment in the case of 
Nordic countries has been increasing since the early 2000s hence showing a structural trend in these 
countries. However, the levels are still far below those registered in Southern Europe that are well 
above the EU-27 average and range between the 30.5% in Portugal and 44.4% in Italy. Regarding 
trends, evidence for Southern Europe is mixed with Italy and Greece exhibiting a decrease since 
2002 whilst Spain and Portugal have increased it. In spite of this decrease, the levels in 2010 were 
in all countries significantly lower compared to the levels of long-term youth unemployment in 
1995, the final year of the early 1990s economic crisis. 
 
Table 2: Youth Long-term Unemployment (> 12 months) as a Share of All Unemployed Youth 
(aged 15-24) 
 1995 2002 2007 2010 
EU-27  33,5 26,1 28,4 
     
Greece 49,8 46,5 41,6 35,6 
Spain 45,9 22,3 10,2 29,3 
Italy 52,2 55,9 40,7 44,4 
Portugal 41,9 22,3 27,7 30,5 
     
Denmark 9,5 : : 6 
Finland 17,3 3,7 5,4 7,5 
Sweden 12,6 4,6 4 7,4 
Source: Eurostat, EULFS 
 
Data about youth unemployment rate has to be handled with care as it tends to underestimate 
the real extent of the problem. This is because youngsters are more likely to come back to education 
or training after short unemployment spells. In this vein, the data contained in table 2 may hide not 
so much a generalized improvement in the employment prospects of young workers (and an earlier 
exit from unemployment) but a move out from the labour market towards inactivity. This is 
consistent with the evidence of decreasing participation rates in all the countries compared here, 
8 
 
though the levels in Nordic countries are significantly lower compared to those of Southern Europe. 
However, this does not necessarily mean there is a move out of unemployment towards education or 
training. As some works have showed, the negative employment prospects that youngsters face has 
led many of them to opt out of the labour market and become passive job seekers or dedicate to 
family (European Commission 2011). Even though activity/inactivity indicators have been 
downplayed in the debate about young workers, recent studies have stressed the need to pay more 
attention to NEET (not in employment, education or training). It is estimated that around 13% of 
youth aged 15-24 are not in employment, neither on education or training, though there are 
remarkable differences between countries. Hence, whilst Italy, Spain and Greece rank high on 
NEETs, the Nordic countries are below the EU average. This means that apart from those 
unemployed, there are a number of discouraged youth with very little chances to find a job in a 
short period. If we add this group to the unemployed, we end up with a significantly large number 
of young people whose immediate future is very uncertain and that will find enormous difficulties 
to become fully integrated into the labour market and society.  
When we look into the distribution of unemployment by education level, we observe how 
the crisis has reduced the positive role played by education as a shelter against unemployment, 
though a  strong negative relationship between unemployment and education level persists. In other 
words, a new aspect of youth unemployment in the present crisis is that education has reduced its 
capacity to protect from unemployment (Eurofund 2012). This applies in general to all Southern 
European countries, though Spain would be an exception as the positive effect of education in order 
to reduce unemployment has increased (García 2011).  
 
Table 3: Unemployment Rate for Aged 15-24 by Education Level in 2000, 2007 and 2011 
 
Pre-
primary, 
primary 
and lower 
secondary 
First and 
second 
stage of 
tertiary 
Pre-
primary, 
primary 
and lower 
secondary 
First and 
second 
stage of 
tertiary 
Pre-
primary, 
primary 
and lower 
secondary 
First and 
second 
stage of 
tertiary 
 2000 2000 2007 2007 2011 2011 
European Union (27 countries) 20,2 12,7 20 11,4 28,2 16,7 
Denmark 6,2 : 8,8 : 16,3 : 
Germany (including  former GDR from 
1991) 9,7 6,8 15,7 : 12,4 : 
Greece 24,1 29,4 17,8 32 43,2 48,6 
Spain 24,6 26,6 20,4 13,6 53,2 35 
France 31,2 11,4 30,2 12,5 35,3 13,4 
Italy 31,7 25,8 22,5 19,3 32,8 27,1 
Netherlands 7,4 : 8,4 : 10,7 4,4 
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Portugal 8,2 : 16,2 25,9 32,6 29 
Finland 43,4 14,8 25,8 : 31,5 : 
Sweden 11,4 : 29,5 12,3 38,6 12,4 
United Kingdom 21,5 5,6 26,4 7,5 36,2 12 
Norway 18,7 : 10,1 : 10,8 : 
Source: Eurostat, EULFS 
 
 
When we look into employment and distinguish between different forms of contracts among young 
workers, we find significant differences in levels between countries, but also in their evolution. The 
first thing to note is that, contrary to what is often assumed, the percentage of young workers (either 
15-24 or 25-34) with the typical permanent full-time job was lower in the Nordic countries 
compared to the Southern European in 2000. This applies to the 15-24 as well as the 25-34 groups. 
The differences remain even in 2007. There is more internal diversity within Southern compared to 
the Nordic countries. Spain ranks significantly lower in full-time permanent employment and by 
contrast it has the highest levels of both full time and part-time temporary contracts.  
 In all countries there seems to be a decrease in more stable and less precarious forms of 
employment. However, this decline a) exhibits some significant differences across countries and b) 
is not directly related to the economic crisis. As can be observed in table 4, the period 2000-2007 
witnessed a decrease in the percentage of young workers with stable and full-time contracts except 
for Finland and Spain. This decline was accompanied by an increase in non-standard forms of 
employment. The countries where the share of typical full-time permanent employment has 
decreased to a larger extent are Italy and Portugal on the Southern cluster and Denmark in the 
Nordic one. In the case of the Nordic cluster, part-time employment expanded during the pre-crisis 
years, and with the only exception of Sweden, there was no change regarding temporary 
employment. In the case of Southern Europe, the largest increases occurred in the case of temporary 
full-time jobs, most notably in Italy and Portugal. Part-time employment did increase but to a lesser 
extent. Interestingly, the economic crisis has not implied a major change with respect to the 
previous trends. Thus in the case of the Nordic countries, there has been a further reduction in the 
percentage of full-time and permanent jobs amongst young workers together with an increase in 
part-timers (most notably in Denmark) on either permanent or fixed-term basis. By contrast, there 
has been a reduction in the percentage of temporary employment. In the case of Southern Europe, in 
all countries with the exception of Spain there has been an increase in atypical forms of 
employment and more specifically, temporary employment. Part-time permanent employment has 
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increased to a larger extent in Spain and Italy. There has also been an increase in the most 
precarious form of employment, that is, temporary and part-time jobs. Spain is an exception as in 
this country there has been a decrease in fixed-term employment since the beginning of the crisis 
together with an increase in the percentage of permanent full-time jobs. 
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Table 4: Atypical Employment in Southern Europe and the Nordic countries, 2000-2009  
 2000     2007-2000 (difference in % points)  2009-2000 (difference in % points) 
DK FT+Perm PT+Perm FT+Temp PT+Temp  FT+Perm PT+Perm FT+Temp PT+Temp  FT+Perm PT+Perm FT+Temp PT+Temp 
15-24 years 35,5% 35,0% 22,0% 7,5%  -5,6 12,6 -7,0 0,0  -15,5 21,7 -6,9 0,6 
25-34 years 72,2% 14,6% 9,1% 4,1%  0,8 0,5 -0,9 -0,4  -4,4 3,5 1,2 -0,3 
SE               
15-24 years 41,3% 14,7% 20,4% 23,6%  -4,4 -0,2 5,0 -0,5  -8,5 0,9 -0,5 8,1 
25-34 years 70,8% 12,2% 10,3% 6,7%  -3,2 2,6 1,7 -1,1  -3,2 3,0 -0,5 0,7 
NO               
15-24 years 37,1% 32,8% 16,5% 13,6%  -4,6 2,6 -1,0 3,0  -3,5 4,1 -4,3 3,8 
25-34 years 71,8% 17,3% 6,3% 4,6%  -0,9 -0,5 1,4 0,0  0,4 -0,5 -0,5 0,6 
FI               
15-24 years 31,3% 17,8% 36,2% 14,8%  2,4 2,2 -5,6 1,0  2,9 4,0 -9,7 2,8 
25-34 years 71,5% 6,3% 18,8% 3,3%  4,4 -0,5 -3,7 -0,2  4,6 -0,5 -4,1 0,0 
               
ES FT+Perm PT+Perm FT+Temp PT+Temp  FT+Perm PT+Perm FT+Temp PT+Temp  FT+Perm PT+Perm FT+Temp PT+Temp 
15-24 years 27,6% 2,6% 59,6% 10,2%  4,5 2,7 -12,0 4,8  8,3 5,4 -20,7 7,0 
25-34 years 55,9% 3,3% 35,4% 5,3%  1,1 2,6 -4,4 0,6  4,0 3,2 -8,1 0,9 
IT               
15-24 years 68,1% 4,7% 20,7% 6,4%  -18,0 3,3 13,1 1,6  -21,8 4,4 13,7 3,7 
25-34 years 80,9% 6,3% 8,6% 4,2%  -9,9 4,3 5,8 -0,2  -11,0 5,6 5,5 -0,1 
PT               
15-24 years 57,3% 1,8% 38,0% 2,8%  -12,8 0,1 9,9 2,9  -15,8 0,6 10,0 5,3 
25-34 years 76,5% 1,4% 20,1% 2,0%  -7,2 0,2 6,1 0,9  -10,3 0,2 8,9 1,2 
GR               
15-24 years 68,3% 2,3% 24,2% 5,2%  -0,4 2,2 -3,7 1,9  -2,5 2,8 -3,3 2,9 
25-34 years 81,1% 2,1% 14,2% 2,7%  1,9 0,7 -2,8 0,2  -1,0 1,0 -0,7 0,7 
Source: EULFS
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The differences between Nordic and Southern countries show how in spite of similar 
pressures, the institutional context matters in the way in which atypical employment develops. With 
the only exception of Spain, Southern European countries have levels of typical employment similar 
to those of the Nordic countries. However, flexibility in Southern has been introduced mostly 
through temporary employment, whilst in the case of Nordic countries it has been part-time. The 
implications of these two different paths are important. First of all, the possibility to rely on stable 
part-time jobs during the education years favours the compatibility between education and work 
compared to full-time temporary jobs. At the same time, a stable part-time relationship provides 
also incentives to invest in specific skills, whilst fixed-term contracts do not provide any kind of 
incentive in this regard. Another reason for the little development of part-time in Southern Europe 
has to do with low wage levels. Finally, a major difference between the Nordic countries and the 
Southern European countries is that atypical employment for youth in the Nordic countries is 
mainly voluntary, while involuntary atypical jobs predominate in the Southern countries (European 
Trade Union Institute (ETUI) (2012: 34-35). 
The above evidence suggests that there has been a generalized deterioration in the position 
of young workers in the labour market, but this is not a direct consequence of the recent economic 
crisis. In other words, young workers have witnessed how developments in labour market 
regulation in the 1990s and 2000s have increased their vulnerable position. As a matter of fact, 
when we compare the unemployment performance of young workers in the current crisis compared 
to the early 1990s one, we observe significantly lower unemployment and long-term unemployment 
rate among young workers. The economic crisis has meant an accentuation of some long-term 
dynamics, but without reaching the  mid 1990s’ levels. However, there is a qualitative change in the 
recent crisis compared to previous episodes as many young workers experiencing unemployment 
have become discouraged and become passive job seekers. This has been particularly the case in 
Southern Europe. It is sensible to think that many of these NEETs are early school leavers whose 
employment prospects are particularly negative. Two inter-related considerations need to be made 
at this stage. 
The first refers to the negative effects that entry flexibility has had for young workers. The 
increase in atypical contracts aimed at facilitating entry and consolidation of young workers clashes 
with their need to invest in generic and job specific training and work experience. As many authors 
have pointed out, young workers do not lack generic human capital, but other occupational 
components that are strongly linked to their work experience. This is the so-called youth experience 
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gap that would require a certain degree of job stability as well as stronger public efforts to provide 
occupational training. The growth of non-standard employment has implications for the 
achievements of objectives relating to lifelong learning, given that part-time and fixed-term 
employment are associated with lower levels of training investment compared with standard 
employment. By contrast, young people experiment frequent job transitions characterized very 
often by short-term contracts. As pointed out by Forrier and Sels (2003: 662), there is accordingly a 
conflict between the demand for greater contractual flexibility and the need to invest in lifelong 
learning as a mechanism to enhance the employability and hence improve employment prospects of 
young workers.  
In this context, some of the policies that have been presented as examples of how flexicurity 
can contribute to alleviate the impact of the economic crisis, i.e., short-time working schemes, 
suffer from some of the problems just mentioned. Thus for instance, it is sensible to think that in a 
context of limited resources, employers will always prefer to apply this type of schemes on older 
workers with more work experience and tenure. In other words, ceteris paribus, young workers will 
benefit to a lower extent from these schemes.  
Another aspect to be considered are the so-called scarring effects of chaotic and fragmented 
labour market trajectories with frequent unemployment spells. According to this, the problems 
experienced by young workers in their earlier stages will have a negative impact on their future 
performance regarding wages and other aspects. The economic downturn is pushing more and more 
youth, even those who would have performed well in good times, into the group of “poorly-
integrated new entrants” and possibly even into the group of “youth left behind”. This reinforces the 
pressure for governments to intervene vigorously in the youth labour market (OECD 2009). 
 
 
 
Section III 
Mobility of Young Workers; Uncertainty facing in the Scandinavian and Mediterranean 
clusters  
The objective of this section is to shed some light into the types and degrees of uncertainty 
young workers face in the Nordic and Mediterranean countries with a view to assess the effect of 
different flexicurity arrangements on labour market transitions. In order to do so, we will first of all 
briefly summarize the main institutional characteristics of flexicurity in the two groups of countries 
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as these provide the context within which to interpret transitions. We will then move to the analysis 
of EU Labour Force Survey data.  
 
III.1 Flexicurity Institutions in Nordic and Southern European countries 
 
Flexicurity in Nordic Countries 
The Nordic countries are conceived as one family of Nordic welfare state models. When it comes to 
the institutional framework around the labour market, there are however significant differences 
(Berglund & Madsen, 2010): 
 Compared to the other Nordic countries, Denmark stands out as having a rather low level of 
job protection. Sweden has the strongest protection of regular employees, but quite liberal 
rules concerning temporary employees. Norway has more strict rules concerning 
temporaries. For regular employees, the rules are more liberal than the Swedish but more 
severe than the Danish. The Finnish rules for regular employees are on the same level as the 
Norwegian. However, they are more liberal than the Norwegian concerning temporary 
employees. 
 With respect to the duration of unemployment benefits, Denmark has until 2010 had a long 
potential duration time in Denmark (48 months) compared to the other three countries (24-
28 months) and a high coverage. The duration of benefits in Denmark was however reduced 
to 24 months taking effect from 2013. In Finland the so-called Labour Market Support has, 
in principle, no time limit. 
 Finally, with respect to active labour market policy, one notes a low overall expenditures 
per unemployed person in Finland. By contrast one sees a high level of expenditures on 
ALMPs in Denmark. 
 
When one looks at the overall levels of different forms of employment mobility in the 
Nordic countries, Denmark gets the highest ranks and Sweden the lowest. Finland and Norway 
appear somewhere in between. The differences in the institutional framework can be expected to 
have influence on the mobility patterns of both younger and older workers. The analysis first of all 
confirms the general impression of younger workers as being in more volatile positions on the 
labour marked in all the Nordic countries. By example their risk of being in a temporary job is 
higher than for older workers.  
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But the also seems to be some national differences, which may be interpreted as caused by 
differences in the national framework, especially with respect to the level of job protection.  For 
example, young Danes have the highest odds of moving into employment from unemployment 
compared to the other three countries. However, their chance of moving from a temporary to a 
permanent job is not larger than for other age groups.  
Finally, when it comes to employment and income security for young workers, the Nordic 
countries show a rather high level of support, but also with significant differences with respect to 
replacement levels (Madsen, 2010). 
 
Table 5: Standardized values of main institutional indicators of Flexicurity 
 
 
Employment 
Protection 
Legislation 
2003 
Unemployment 
Benefits 
2003 
Active Labour 
Market Policies 
2003 
Lifelong learning 
2006 
Nordic     
Denmark 0.30 0.34 0.31 0.29 
Finland 0.35 0.18 0.10 0.23 
Norway 0.43 0.19 0.18 0.19 
Sweden 0.43 0.22 0.23 0.32 
Mediterranean     
Greece 0,48 0,04 0,02 0,02 
Italy 0,40 0,10 0,08 0,06 
Portugal 0,58 0,17 0,11 0,04 
Spain 0,51 0,16 0,06 0,1 
 
 
Flexicurity in Southern Europe 
Even though an analysis based on traditional indicators of flexicurity shows a rather 
symmetrical picture for Southern European countries compared to the Danish model, a closer look 
into what’s behind these indicators shows a more complex picture. Most quantitative flexicurity 
analysis end up concluding the existence of a Mediterranean model, though some studies consider 
Italy as an outlier to the rest of Southern European countries. This shows first of all the sensitivity 
of flexicurity analyses to the type and weight of indicators used. The implication of this is the need 
to go beyond existing indicators and provide contextualised interpretations of their meaning. Most 
importantly, the disagreement about where to position some countries within the flexicurity 
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paradigm warns us about data-based oversimplifications of reality. An excessive and unduly use of 
aprioristic typologies may lead to wrong conclusions. 
 This would be the case of Spain, which according to most analyses that use the OECD 
Employment Protection Legislation index is a country with high levels of formal employment 
protection both for regular as well as temporary workers. However the labour market reality of 
Spain is hardly reflected in this indicator. If we use other non-formal indicators of flexibility like 
labour market mobility, transitions etc., we observe how Spain ranks amongst the countries with 
highest levels together with Denmark and the UK, i.e., two countries with very low levels of EPL. 
As a matter of fact, the labour market reality of the Spain makes it closer to that of countries with 
flexible regulations. 
 When it comes to unemployment benefits in Southern Europe, we observe how Spain and 
Portugal have the most generous unemployment benefit systems including both insurance and 
assistance schemes. Nonetheless, here it is important to take into account the institutional 
characteristics of mechanisms other than strict unemployment benefit schemes. Hence, Italy scores 
low in terms of generosity and duration of unemployment benefits, but the picture changes radically 
if we take into account other institutions that formally lay out of social protection policies but that 
has functionally equivalent results. This is the case of CIG in Italy that provides generous income 
support for workers affected by temporary company restructuring.  
 Moreover, common to both the employment protection as well as unemployment benefit 
indicators are the problems posed by self-employment, a mechanism of flexibility which is used 
extensively in Southern Europe. Not only self-employment escapes very often formal protection, 
but self-employed workers lack unemployment protection. Provided the high levels of self-
employment that characterise all Mediterranean countries, we can conclude that formal flexicurity 
indicators not only underestimate the real degree of flexibility in Mediterranean labour markets, but 
they also overestimate the level of security provided by the unemployment benefit system.  
 All four countries have similarly low levels of expenditure on active labour market policies 
and lifelong learning. Only Spain seems to report higher expenditure levels though also in this case 
it would be necessary to look into the specific programs and their effectiveness.  
 The implications of the above cross-country differences for employment and income 
uncertainty facing young workers are particularly interesting in the context of the present research. 
The interaction between the forms of flexibility and the mechanisms of income protection against 
unemployment deliver multifarious risks for young workers which are different to those of older 
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workers. Even though there has been a generalized increase in the percentage of both young and old 
Spain is by far the country with highest rates of fixed-term contracts. Portugal is moving very 
rapidly towards the levels of temporary employment reported in Spain. It is precisely the extension 
of temporary employment what determines the existence of higher levels of mobility, labour 
turnover and labour market transitions. At the same time, this would explain the lower incidence of 
long-term unemployment amongst young workers as high levels as they have a higher probability of 
finding a temporary job. Portugal is characerized by a similar situation for young workers. This 
contrasts with the situation in Italy and to a lesser extent Greece, where lower levels of labour 
market mobility mirror into significantly higher levels of long-term unemployment for young 
workers. Accordingly, employment uncertainty in Spain and to a lesser extent Portugal seems to be 
more related to the stabilization, whilst in Italy and Greece, it is related to the risk of remaining 
long-term unemployed until an stable job is found.  
 Regarding income uncertainty, it is difficult with the available evidence to arrive at any 
meaningful conclusion. Compared to Greece and Italy, Spain and Portugal have a more generous 
and durable unemployment benefit protection system. This in principle would be in line with 
flexicurity principles that argue for a flexible labour market and generous unemployment 
protection. However, the very short duration of a large share of temporary jobs in Spain makes it 
very difficult for young workers in Spain to gain access to the insurance scheme. Young workers in 
Italy and Greece face a different problem related to long unemployment spells that make it also 
difficult to obtain unemployment benefit. Moreover, these two countries lack mechanisms of 
income protection for those in long-term unemployment.  
Notwithstanding the above differences, common to all Southern European countries is the 
important role still played by the family. The family provides income support to young Italian and 
Greek workers in their long road towards (stable) employment. By contrast, the family in Spain and 
Portugal plays also a supportive role, very often by complementing the low wage earned under 
temporary contracts. The social sustainability of the Mediterranean model is nonetheless threatened 
by changes occurring in family structures and patterns with a significant increase in mono-parental 
households. 
 
III.2 Labour Market Transitions in Scandinavian and Southern European countries 
Some Notes on Methodology 
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The analysis of labour market transitions has been made using the EU Labour Force Survey 
(LFS). The data include rather detailed items concerning a vast number of labour market related 
statuses, situations and incidences. The LFS provides an adequate source in order to perform this 
comparison thanks to its comparability. However, as the dataset does not have a panel structure, we 
have to use retrospective variables to study mobility, which of course raises some methodological 
issues. First, the number of transitions and their dimensions is limited. Secondly, using retrospective 
questions often has a downward bias regarding transitions and mobility. It is reasonable to assume 
that people forget changes, they tend to forget when they have made a transition or they forget their 
labor market status one year earlier. For example when people are asked whether they changed job 
during the last 12 months, they often do not remember precisely, when a change occurred. 
However, this problem shouldn’t be different between countries or between the Nordic and 
Mediterranean cluster.. If the LFS data have systematic error in estimating the level of mobility, the 
error is very likely to be similar in all countries, because the data are gathered in a standardized way 
– even though the context and the exact wordings of questions in different languages can never be 
completely standardized. 
Mobility is measured by a retrospective question regarding the main status (employed, 
unemployed or inactivity) of the respondent one year before the survey [WSTAT1Y]. Coefficients 
are presented in the form of odds ratios. An odds is a probability that a certain event will occur 
divided by the probability that it will not happen. We use reference categories to which  odds for a 
certain category is compared. For example, if men are the reference category, the odds for women is 
divided by the odds for men (Odds(w)/Odds(m)). A ratio of 1 indicates that the odds for the two 
categories are equal. However, it is important to remember that the predicted probabilities presented 
are not absolute values, but statistical pre-dictions according to a model, thus with the normal 
statistical uncertainties. 
Regarding the independent variables, we have incorporated most of the possible 
determinants in a standard model that has been used in a similar way in all the multivariate analyses 
conducted. The independent variables included and their categories have been driven by data (what 
is available in all countries), theory (what can be expected to have an effect on mobility), and 
testing (codification and selection based on what works). The first group of variables has to do with 
individual characteristics, including gender, age, marital status, and education level. The second 
group of variables has to do with the individual’s labour market situation. These include 
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occupational categories as well as a variable about the individual’s situation outside the labour 
force.  
Our ambition is to make a comparison both between the eight selected countries individually 
and between the Mediterranean and the Nordic clusters. Earlier on in this paper we discussed the 
impact of flexicurity policies and institutions on the uncertainty facing workers in the labour 
markets of both Nordic and Mediterranean countries. Here we focus on the effect of flexicurity on 
young workers aged 16-24 and 25-34 years. In order to do so, we explore mobility patterns for these 
groups.  
In order to shed some light into the effect of the crisis on the position of youth in the labour 
market, we have carried out a separate analysis of mobility patterns for the pre-crisis years (2000-
2007) and the crisis years (2008-2009). This allows us to observe changes caused by the crisis in the 
effect of different variables on transitions. 
Even though there are six possible transitions, we will focus on employment mobility. The 
expectations when it comes to these can be summarized as follows. Firstly, we expect that 
transitions from employment to unemployment are more frequent, when employment protection 
legislation is weak. With respect to transitions from employment to inactivity, we must expect 
something similar to switches from employment to unemployment. It is likely that the strictness of 
employment protection legislation is the important determinant, possibly in combination with the 
patterns regarding fixed-term contracts. Also, transitions to employment may be affected by 
employment protection legislation. If it is costly for employers to dismiss workers, they may be 
more hesitant to hire people. Such a mechanism can thus slow down the flows to employment from 
unemployment or inactivity. We should consequently expect transition rates to employment to be 
particularly high in the Nordic countries.  
However, this assumption may need to be modified, when taking the impact of 
unemployment benefits and active labor market policy into account. On the one hand, generous 
unemployment benefits—in terms of replacement levels and duration—may have a negative impact 
on flows out of unemployment; the assumption is then that people on benefits are less motivated to 
find a job. There is a great deal of empirical research pointing in that direction. On the other hand, 
active labor market policies may increase chances for job seekers to find work, but it still remains a 
rather controversial issue, the effective impact of such policies. In this area, Denmark is the most 
interesting country among the four Nordic countries. Denmark has rather generous unemployment 
insurance, and it spends more on active labour market policies than most other OECD-countries. At 
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the same time, the other Nordic countries also score rather high on these measures. The main 
difference may be the strictness of employment protection legislation. If the flexicurity model 
functions as has been suggested, Denmark’s mixture of measures might lead to high levels of 
transitions from unemployment and inactivity to employment. Nevertheless, it is possible that some 
of the measures outbalance each other. Our data will hopefully shed some light on such issues 
regarding differences between countries within the two clusters. 
 
Labour Market Flows and Transitions 
The first step in the analysis consists in providing an overview of labour market flows in 
order to obtain an indication of how mobility levels vary across countries as well as over time. 
Secondly, we examine the main determinants behind the transitions. In order to do so, we include 
variables such as sex, age, industry, type of employment contract, size of workplace and 
unemployment levels. The question is whether the main determinants behind mobility patterns are 
generally the same in all eight countries compared. Third, we show the predicted probabilities of 
transitions for a number of categories —male manual workers, female manual workers, male 
professionals, female professionals, etc. The categories are selected to represent fairly large 
occupational groupings.  
In order to understand the reasons that have led to the comparatively worsening performance 
of young workers in European labour markets, we have to look into the period that preceded the 
economic crisis. First of all, this will help us to understand the degree to which the situation has 
changed as a consequence of the crisis. Moreover, it will also shed some light into the asymmetrical 
incidence of age upon labour market flexibility across the countries compared. 
The data in table 6 shows labour market transitions for persons aged 24-35. As can be 
observed, there are no significant differences across countries or clusters in transitions from 
employment to either unemployment or inactivity either in the 2000-2007 or 208-09 periods. If we 
turn to flows out of unemployment, the picture changes dramatically as we find important 
differences, not only between the clusters compared, but also within countries in each cluster. First, 
even though the percentage of people remaining unemployed at t is on average higher in Southern 
Europe, there are substantial differences within this group of countries with Italy and Greece 
showing much higher levels of people remaining in the unemployment status compared to Spain 
and Portugal. Moreover, Spain also stands out compared to the other Southern European countries 
due to the high levels of people moving from unemployment towards inactivity. As a matter of fact, 
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the numbers for Spain are closer to the Scandinavian than to the Southern European. The higher 
percentage of people moving out from unemployment to either employment or inactivity is a 
reflection of the lower uncertainty facing young workers in the Nordic countries as it is easier for 
them to leave the unemployed status. The crisis has but aggravated these differences between the 
clusters. Hence, the percentage of young workers trapped into unemployment has grown, whilst in 
the case of Nordic countries it has decreased. Regarding transitions from inactivity, Southern 
European countries exhibit higher degrees of stability into this status compared to theNordic 
countries. More specifically, flows from inactivity towards employment are significantly higher in 
Nordic compared to Southern European countries hence showing also the difficulties young 
workers face in their school to work transitions. There are no remarkable changes as a consequence 
of the economic crisis. 
 
Table 6: Labour Market Transitions for persons aged 25-34, period 2000-2009 
Period 2000-2007         
 DK SE NO FI ES IT PT GR 
Employed at t-1, status at t:         
Employed 89% 93% 95% 90% 92% 95% 95% 95% 
Unemployed 4% 3% 2% 3% 4% 3% 4% 4% 
Inactive 7% 4% 3% 7% 4% 2% 1% 1% 
Unemployed at t-1, status at t:         
Unemployed 32% 36% 43% 45% 34% 69% 48% 69% 
Employed 51% 46% 45% 39% 50% 28% 46% 28% 
Inactive 16% 18% 12% 16% 16% 4% 6% 3% 
Inactive at t-1, status at t:         
Inactive 50% 58% 64% 60% 63% 82% 73% 84% 
Unemployed 11% 9% 10% 8% 12% 8% 12% 8% 
Employed 39% 32% 26% 32% 24% 10% 14% 8% 
         
         
Period 2008-2009         
 DK SE NO FI ES IT PT GR 
Employed at t-1, status at t:         
Employed 89% 90%  89% 89% 94% 93% 95% 
Unemployed 4% 3%  3% 8% 5% 6% 4% 
Inactive 7% 7%  8% 3% 2% 1% 1% 
Unemployed at t-1, status at t:         
Unemployed 26% 34%  44% 47% 71% 51% 69% 
Employed 63% 46%  38% 41% 25% 44% 27% 
Inactive 11% 20%  19% 12% 4% 5% 4% 
Inactive at t-1, status at t:         
Inactive 48% 55%  59% 65% 83% 70% 83% 
Unemployed 9% 9%  7% 15% 8% 16% 9% 
Employed 43% 36%  34% 20% 9% 14% 8% 
 
22 
 
Source: Own elaboration using EU-LFS data 
 
 
The above shows how there is generally more mobility in the Nordic countries compared to 
Southern Europe. The most important differences between the two clusters appear with regard to 
transitions from inactivity and unemployment. This is probably related to differences in the 
behavior of particular groups such as young workers in general, or young women in particular. 
Moreover, institutional differences regarding the effect of active labour market policies facilitating 
transitions out of inactivity or unemployment would also help to explain higher flows in 
Scandinavian countries for persons being inactive. Some differences are also observed between 
countries within the two clusters, where two countries stand out; Finland within the Nordic and 
Spain within the Southern European.  
Generally speaking, transition rates from employment to unemployment are higher in the 
Mediterranean countries compared to the four Nordic countries, though with the exception of Spain 
in the recent crisis period, the differences are not remarkable. This would go against the view that 
stricter EPL (as in Southern Europe) mirrors into lower flows towards unemployment. The same 
holds when we look into at young people aged 16-24.  
When we move to the comparative analysis of transitions over time (graphs 1 to 4) we 
observe no clear pattern for the proportions of young workers making this particular transition over 
time. It seems that Denmark, Sweden and Norway have experienced an increase in the proportion of 
young workers moving into unemployment in the years 1999-2004. After the peak, the decline is 
particularly strong in Denmark. Furthermore, there is no clear pattern regarding the curves for the 
four Mediterranean countries. Italy and Portugal have experienced a moderate increase in the 
proportion of young workers moving into unemployment, while Spain has experienced rather large 
increases in the proportion of young workers changing labor market status from employment to 
unemployment – peaking at 10-12 % in 2008 as a consequence of the economic crisis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
Graph 1: Employment to unemployment transition rates for young people (aged 15-24) 
  
Source: EULFS 
 
The pattern for transitions from employment to inactivity for younger workers, is similar to 
the one observed for all workers. The proportions of young people making this particular transition 
are much higher in the Nordic countries thus indicating that the high overall transition-rates from 
employment to inactivity in the Nordic countries are not to be explained alone by generous 
retirement schemes. It also seems that young people are remarkably more mobile between education 
and employment in the Nordic countries, though there are great variations within this cluster. 
Finally we must point out, that methodological issues must be taken into account here. The 
extremely high proportions in Denmark and Finland can perhaps be explained by the nature of the 
retrospective question of “status one year ago” as this question creates some difficulties when 
measuring transitions. And especially in the Nordic countries it is likely that part time working high 
school students have reported a transition, when in fact they may not have made one. Overall, the 
difference between two clusters can be related to two aspects: first of all, the greater participation of 
Scandinavian young workers in training and formal education; secondly, the different pattern in 
behavior of young women.  
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Graph 2: Employment to inactivity transition rates for young people (aged 15-24)  
  
Source: EULFS 
 
Transitions from unemployment to employment exhibit little variation over time. 
Furthermore, there are not great variations within the clusters, though the transition rates for Italy 
and Spain are somewhat higher especially in the late 2000’s than in the other Mediterranean 
countries. The Finnish and Swedish figures are lower than those for both Norway and Denmark 
throughout. A similar pattern is exhibited by transitions from employment to inactivity, where 
transitions from inactivity to employment are remarkably higher in the Nordic countries than in the 
Mediterranean countries. This evidence does not allow robust evidence that would allow tosupport 
the insight that countries with stricter EPL would have lower transitions towards employment. It 
certainly would apply in the case of transitions from inactivity to employment, but not in transitions 
from unemployment to employment, where we observe some Southern European countries 
exhibiting higher rates compared to the Nordic cluster. 
 
Graph 3: Unemployment to employment transition rates for young people (aged 15-24) 
  
Source: EULFS 
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When comparing transitions to employment, it is also important to take into consideration 
not only the quantitative aspect (percentage of flows) but also the type of contract they may get 
once they leave either unemployment or inactivity. In this regard, the higher transitions out of 
unemployment into employment in Spain and Portugal in the Southern cluster (see table 4) are due 
to the higher levels of temporary employment in these two countries compared to Greece or Italy. 
Thus it is true that exiting unemployment is probably easier, but it can’t be taken as a sign of less 
uncertainty, because of high job rotation. 
 
Graph 4: Inactivity to employment transition rates for young people (aged 15-24)  
  
Source: EULFS 
 
Overall, we can extract three main conclusions from the above evidence. First of all, there 
are some significant differences between the two groups of countries when it comes to the 
frequency of transitions between different labour market statuses. These differences are particularly 
marked when it comes to transitions between employment and inactivity. As we will discuss later 
with more detail, these differences may be related first of all the role of flexicurity institutions 
which would facilitate transitions from employment towards education and the reverse. But they 
also may reflect the greater difficulties imposed by the institutional environment onto women in 
Southern Europe in order to make compatible work and family charges, and in particular childcare. 
However, the above data also highlights the existence of some remarkable differences within each 
of the two clusters. These differences are particularly marked when it comes to transition between 
employment and unemployment for young people as this form of mobility is particularly affected 
by pre-existing mechanisms of flexibility etc. We will come back later to explaining these 
differences. A final point concerns the dynamics of transitions as well as of differences between the 
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countries compared. The main characteristic in the evolution of the different indicators used is the 
stable differences between the countries and more generally, the maintenance of similar levels 
across the period studied, though with some exceptions. This would in principle put into question 
the effectiveness of flexicurity policies in the Mediterranean countries that have been characterized 
precisely by a strong emphasis on the development and implementation of flexibility and 
mechanisms to increase mobility mostly from inactivity and unemployment towards employment. 
 
Determinants of labour market transitions 
Transitions from Employment 
In order to shed further light into the individual determinants of differences in labour market 
transitions as well as their asymmetrical incidence across countries, we use multinomial logistic 
analysis applied into a pooled dataset. As mentioned earlier, we have split the dataset into two 
periods in order to observe the impact of the economic crisis. Data has been pooled for the pre-crisis 
(2000-2007) and crisis (2008-2009) periods and the same statistical analysis has been carried out in 
the two periods separately.  
Tables A2 and A3 show the outcome on transitions from employment to unemployment and 
inactivity respectively.  Starting with sex, there are two main conclusions to be drawn. The patterns 
regarding transitions from employment to unemployment are rather inconsistent across countries in 
the Nordic cluster. In Denmark and Finland men are less likely than women to become unemployed 
but only in the pre-crisis. Norway and Sweden show no sex-significant differences. The 
Mediterranean cases represent a different picture: men are highly significant less likely to become 
unemployed across the board in the four Mediterranean countries. This situation does not change as 
a result of the economic crisis. Among Southern Europe, Greece is the country with the lower odds 
hence reflecting a particularly disadvantaged situation for young women. The role of sex in 
transitions from employment to inactivity for aged 15-24 is similar in all countries compared shows 
a lower probability for men to move to inactivity. In the case of Southern Europe, it is even less 
likely for young men to move to inactivity compared to women. Thus women tend to exit 
employment for inactivity more often than men do in all countries. 
When it comes to age as a dimension to understand transitions out of employment, it is 
found to be significant in all countries, except in the case of Denmark in the pre-crisis years and 
Norway in the crisis years. The Nordic countries resemble each other in terms of low risks among 
the youngest to become unemployed. Only in Sweden and Norway, we find significant coefficients 
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in the 2000-2007 period regarding enhanced risks of becoming unemployed for the youngest group. 
In the case of Southern Europe, the results show a higher probability for young workers to move to 
unemployment compared to the Nordic countries. The young workers are at greater risk of 
becoming unemployed in the Mediterranean countries than in the Nordic countries and the oldest 
age group are significantly less likely to become unemployed than the reference group in all three 
countries.  
As we could expect, age also has a significant effect in explaining transitions towards 
inactivity. The probability of a young worker to move to inactivity is significantly higher in Nordic 
as compared to Southern European countries. Within Southern Europe, Greece has experienced a 
significant change in the crisis years as the probability for a young worker to move towards 
inactivity has increased significantly. 
Therefore, the age patterns in the Nordic countries do not correspond with the belief that 
young age is associated with a greater risk of unemployment. This assumption is based on the fact 
that employment protection legislation is aimed at protecting employees with longer tenure. This 
would nonetheless be the case in Southern Europe. The rather low level of EPL in the Nordic 
countries compared to Southern Europe thus seems to reduce segmentation of the labour market on 
an age basis in the Nordic cluster.  
Education is another variable that is likely to play a significant role in explaining labour 
market transitions. The results in table A2 show a significant effect in all countries when we look at 
flows towards unemployment. In this vein, the less educated young workers are more likely to fall 
into unemployment compared to the better educated. The economic crisis increases the probability 
of young with lower levels of education to move towards unemployment except in the case of 
Finland. Interestingly, in the case of Southern Europe there is no significant difference in the 
probability of less educated young to move to unemployment when we compare the 2000-2007 and 
2008-09 periods. As a matter of fact, the probability in the case of Greece decreases in the crisis 
years, henceshowing a less prominent role of education as determinant of flows out of employment. 
As we could expect, the probability of less educated young to move to inactivity is higher compared 
to the more educated both in Nordic and Southern European countries. There are no remarkable 
differences between the two periods compared, with the exception of Portugal, where education 
does not seem to play any role in explaining transitions from employment to inactivity.  
 
Transitions from Unemployment 
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 When it comes to flows from unemployment to employment, table A4 shows how sex does 
not seem to have any effect in Nordic countries, except for Finland and Denmark in the crisis years 
(2008-09). In these two cases, it is less likely for young men compared to women to find a job when 
unemployed. Similarly to what happened in the case of transitions from employment, sex does play 
an important role in Southern Europe. In all countries within this cluster, it is less likely for women 
to find a job when unemployed. The only exception would be Spain in the crisis years, where sex 
does not seem to be an important explanatory variable. This is probably linked to the characteristics 
of the crisis and underlying adjustment in the labour market, characterized by a remarkable 
destruction of jobs in the construction sector. 
 It is also interesting to observe transitions out of unemployment towards inactivity as in this 
case sex plays a role in both the Nordic and Southern European countries. More specifically, in all 
countries men are less likely to move towards inactivity than women. 
 Regarding the role of age, it has a significant impact on transitions in the Nordic countries, 
with Denmark and Finland exhibiting higher odds compared to the rest. In all cases, it is more likely 
for young workers to move out from unemployment and find a job. The two youngest categories 
have higher odds of making the transition into employment across the board, However, the crisis 
seems to have lowered the impact of age on these transitions. A similar pattern can be observed in 
Southern Europe, with Portugal exhibiting higher probability for young workers to exit 
unemployment and find a job. Age is also important to explain transitions towards inactivity, with 
young workers being more likely to move to this status once unemployed. Among the Nordic 
countries, Denmark and Finland have particularly high probabilities for young workers to become 
inactive probably as a reflection of a move into education In the case of Southern Europe, the effect 
of age is not so clear. In the pre-crisis period (2000-2007), age did not have a significant impact. It 
did have an impact in the crisis years in Italy.  
 The role of education follows the expected theoretical pattern in the Nordic countries, where 
it has a significant impact and shows how the less educated are less likely to move to employment 
once unemployed. A similar pattern can be observed in Southern Europe. In all countries, the crisis 
does not seem to decrease the probability for the less educated compared to the better educated to 
move out of unemployment. When it comes to transitions to inactivity (A5), there is no clear pattern 
as to the role it plays in Nordic countries. In most countries, it has no role. In the case of Southern 
Europe, it is important to note the fact that whilst education did play a role in all countries in 
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explaining transitions towards inactivity in the pre-crisis years, it did not play any role in explaining 
these transitions in the crisis years (2008-2009).  
 
Transitions from Inactivity 
 Finally, when it comes to transitions from inactivity to employment (A6), sex does not play 
any role in the Nordic countries. This is different when we look at Southern Europe where sex is 
significant and the probability for inactive men to move towards employment is higher compared to 
women. Inactive men are more likely to become employed than inactive women in the four 
southern European countries. The crisis has nonetheless reduced these differences in Southern 
Europe, and in the case of Spain it does not play a role in the crisis years. By contrast, sex 
differences are important in the Nordic countries when we look at transitions towards 
unemployment (table A7), except for Denmark in the pre-crisis period. In these countries, the 
probability for men to move out of inactivity into unemployment is higher compared to women. In 
the case of Southern Europe, the role of sex does not follow a clear pattern. In the case of Spain, sex 
is significant and men are les likely to move from inactivity to unemployment. By contrast, in Italy 
and Portugal, men are more likely to do so. Finally, differences between men and women are not 
significant in the case of Greece.  
 Younger workers in the Nordic countries are significantly more likely to move from 
inactivity to employment and this is also the case in Southern Europe. A similar pattern applies to 
transitions from inactivity to unemployment, except for Portugal.  
 When it comes to the role of education, it does play a significant role in explaining 
transitions from inactivity to employment in the two country groups considered with almost no 
change between the two periods analysed. In all cases, less educated are less likely to find a job 
once inactive. Looking at transitions from inactivity to unemployment, we also observe significant 
odds in all the countries, with a lower probability for inactive low educated to move to 
unemployment.  
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Section IV: Concluding Remarks and Policy Recommendations 
 
The position of young workers in European labour markets is exposed to mounting risks and 
uncertainty resulting from increased flexibility. Even though the recession has aggravated these 
problems, the situation of youth in the labour market is the result of a series of regulatory changes 
that have not contributed to halt this process. The implications of this trend go far beyond the labour 
market as persistent and increasingly long youth unemployment constitute a major threat for the 
sustainability of EU social models.  
However, the extent and form of uncertainty facing young workers varies significantly from 
country to country. This variation is correlated to the different degree and form of implementation 
of flexicurity policies. Not only have Southern European countries to a lesser extent developed the 
flexicurity paradigm and devoted resources to active labour market policies, but the form in which 
the flexibility part of the paradigm has been implemented has consisted in developing external 
flexibility (mostly through temporary employment) in Southern Europe, whilst in the Nordic 
countries, part-time flexibility is much more frequent. This would also explain the predominantly 
involuntary character of atypical employment in Southern Europe and its predominantly voluntary 
character in the Nordic countries.  
The comparative analysis of labour market dynamics of young workers in Nordic and 
Southern European countries has shed some light into the determinants of this gradual deterioration 
in young workers’ labour market situation. More specifically, the analysis of transitions in the pre-
crisis years, i.e., a context of extension and implementation of flexicurity policies in all EU 
countries, shows first of all how it has had an asymmetric impact on young workers. Thus age had a 
significant effect on the probability an individual had to become unemployed or to find a job in both 
the Nordic countries and Southern Europe, though it was less strong in the former group. In other 
words, age matters when explaining labour market transitions and its effect is particularly strong in 
Southern Europe. Moreover, sex differences are important in Southern Europe when explaining 
transitions, whilst they’re generally non important in the Nordic countries. Finally, there is some 
evidence of a less significant role of education as a shelter against the possibility of becoming 
unemployed, or of moving quickly out of inactivity into employment. 
The economic crisis has led to an increasing divergence when it comes to the position of 
young workers in SE and the Nordic countries. In spite of a generalised deterioration of the 
youngest in the labour market, this has been more significant in those countries where flexicurity 
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has been implemented to a lesser extent and with a focus on enhancing external flexibility and more 
specifically temporary employment. Differences within clusters are also remarkable, particularly in 
Southern Europe that exhibits greater diversity than is very often recognised. 
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Annex 
 
Table A1: Labour Market Transitions for aged 16-24, period 2000-2009 
Period 2000-2007         
 DK SE NO FI ES IT PT GR 
Employed at t-1, status at t         
Employed 55% 78% 86% 62% 87% 91% 90% 90% 
Unemployed 3% 5% 5% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 
Inactive 41% 16% 9% 33% 6% 3% 3% 4% 
Unemployed at t-1, status at t         
Unemployed 29% 30% 33% 36% 36% 69% 39% 67% 
Employed 49% 43% 42% 34% 51% 26% 52% 27% 
Inactive 22% 27% 24% 30% 12% 5% 9% 6% 
Inactive at t-1, status at t         
Inactive 74% 76% 65% 82% 78% 91% 87% 91% 
Unemployed 4% 5% 12% 4% 7% 5% 4% 4% 
Employed 22% 19% 23% 13% 15% 4% 9% 5% 
Period 2008-2009         
 DK SE NO FI ES IT PT GR 
Employed at t-1, status at t         
Employed 48% 72%  68% 79% 89% 87% 87% 
Unemployed 4% 9%  7% 15% 9% 9% 6% 
Inactive 48% 19%  26% 6% 3% 4% 7% 
Unemployed at t-1, status at t         
Unemployed 30% 34%  34% 50% 73% 43% 66% 
Employed 42% 39%  28% 37% 24% 50% 27% 
Inactive 28% 27%  38% 13% 3% 7% 8% 
Inactive at t-1, status at t         
Inactive 78% 75%  84% 81% 92% 87% 92% 
Unemployed 4% 9%  3% 9% 5% 5% 4% 
Employed 18% 17%  13% 10% 4% 8% 4% 
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Table A2: Transitions from Employment to Unemployment 
 
  DK DK SE SE NO NO FI FI ES ES IT IT GR GR PT PT 
  2000-07 2008-09 2000-07 2008-09 2000-07 2008-09 2000-07 2008-09 2000-07 2008-09 2000-07 2008-09 2000-07 2008-09 2000-07 2008-09 
                  
Gender                  
Male  0,74 0,89ns 1,06ns  0,94 ns  0,88 1,01 ns 0,67 0,85 0,75 0,78 0,53 0,53 0,70 0,67 
Female (ref)                  
Age                  
16-24  1,13 ns 1,75 3,84  4,16  1,62 1,32 ns 2,44 2,85 3,51 3,33 2,29 2,63 2,08 2,39 
25-34  1,12 ns 1,38 1,89  2,36  1,11 0,81 ns 1,96 1,74 2,29 2,01 1,91 1,85 1,64 1,77 
35-44  1,11 ns 1,31 1,25  1,67  1,10 1,07 ns 1,43 1,31 1,44 1,35 1,31 1,32 1,11 1,22 
55-63  1,70 ns 1,28 1,27  1,10 ns  1,62 1,28 ns 0,79 0,83 ns 0,92 0,90 ns 0,91 0,85 ns 1,44 1,28 
45-54 (ref)                  
Marital Status                 
Widowed, Divorced 1,62 1,87 1,54  1,97  1,63 1,47 1,79 1,70 1,45 1,41 1,56 1,73 1,33 1,07 ns 
Single  1,86 1,98 1,27  2,03  1,59 1,56 1,40 1,46 1,49 1,38 1,72 1,63 1,30 1,41 
Married (ref)                 
Education                  
Primary  1,97 2,13 2,22  1,90  3,13 3,06 2,28 2,59 2,44 2,49 2,50 2,32 1,86 2,34 
Secondary  1,17 1,41 1,56  1,41  2,27 1,88 1,61 1,53 1,37 1,37 1,76 1,40 1,30 1,68 
Tertiary (ref)                 
Previous Occupational Status                 
Self-Employed 0,80 0,38 0,60  0,51  0,33 0,39 0,29 0,28 0,63 0,74 0,37 0,38 0,48 0,59 
Employee                  
Sector                  
Non-Manufacturing 0,94 ns 1,44 0,80  1,31  1,02 ns 0,99 ns 1,14 1,73 1,10 1,18 1,17 1,21 1,35 1,52 
Manufacturing                 
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Table A3: Transitions from Employment to Inactivity 
 
  DK DK SE SE NO NO FI FI ES ES IT IT GR GR PT PT 
  
2000-
07 
2008-
09 
2000-
07 
2008-
09 
2000-
07 
2008-
09 
2000-
07 
2008-
09 
2000-
07 
2008-
09 
2000-
07 
2008-
09 
2000-
07 
2008-
09 
2000-
07 
2008-
09 
Gender                  
Male  0,61 0,65 0,51  0,58  0,59 0,46 0,48 0,49 0,50 0,53 0,51 0,49 0,57 0,63 
Female (ref)                  
Age                  
16-24  27,73 27,99 18,17  7,66  23,86 16,43 3,33 3,32 2,77 3,49 3,22 4,38 2,13 2,20 
25-34  3,84 3,71 4,65  2,47  4,09 3,63 1,83 1,53 1,30 1,83 0,84 0,67 0,68 0,73 
35-44  1,31 1,48 1,76  1,05 ns  1,35 1,44 1,09 ns 1,06 ns 0,69 0,98 ns 0,48 0,54 0,55 0,63 
55-63  7,02 6,78 4,00  4,60  5,47 3,55 3,25 3,01 7,65 10,73 5,73 4,27 3,46 3,51 
45-54 (ref)                  
Marital Status                 
Widowed, Divorced, 
Separated 1,16 1,29 0,98 ns  1,26  0,87 0,97 ns 0,87 ns 0,76 0,80 0,81 0,72 0,62 0,90 ns 1,07 ns 
Single  1,86 1,56 0,89  1,17 ns  1,12 0,89 ns 0,76 0,86 ns 0,65 0,67 0,65 0,80 1,08 1,13 ns 
Married (ref)                 
Education                  
Primary  2,37 2,37 1,50  1,40  1,62 1,38 1,91 1,98 1,93 1,68 1,70 1,69 1,36 1,02 ns 
Secondary  1,24 1,51 1,10  1,05 ns  1,32 1,23 1,36 1,48 1,38 1,29 1,63 1,55 1,41 1,06 ns 
Tertiary (ref)                 
Previous Occupational Status                 
Self-Employed 0,78 0,73 0,83  1,08 ns  0,83 0,96 ns 0,54 0,44 0,62 0,61 0,59 0,75 1,56 1,39 
Employee                  
Sector                  
Non-Manufacturing 0,50 0,59 0,69  1,94  0,72 0,73 1,05 ns 1,13 ns 1,25 1,26 0,94 0,84 0,93 1,26 
Manufacturing                 
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Table A4: Transitions from Unemployment to Employment 
 
  DK DK SE SE NO NO FI FI ES ES IT IT GR GR PT PT 
  
2000-
07 
2008-
09 
2000-
07 
2008-
09 
2000-
07 
2008-
09 
2000-
07 
2008-
09 
2000-
07 
2008-
09 
2000-
07 
2008-
09 
2000-
07 
2008-
09 
2000-
07 
2008-
09 
Gender                  
Male  0,99 ns 0,73 0,96 ns 0,93 ns 0,92 ns  0,74 0,75 1,31 1,04 ns 1,54 1,34 1,91 1,57 1,21 1,17 
Female (ref)                  
Age                  
16-24  2,22 1,63 1,82 1,36 2,76  2,32 1,63 2,04 1,70 1,34 1,67 2,25 1,90 3,76 3,50 
25-34  1,80 1,90 1,46 1,46 1,83  1,84 1,38 ns 1,91 1,70 1,19 1,52 1,96 1,63 2,39 2,30 
35-44  1,40 1,22 1,10 ns 1,32 1,05 ns  1,35 1,34 ns 1,49 1,29 1,07 1,24 1,42 1,07 ns 1,64 1,47 
55-63  0,38 0,70 0,56 0,72 0,53  0,29 0,31 0,47 0,52 0,75 0,67 0,67 0,50 0,46 0,48 
45-54 (ref)                  
Marital Status                 
Widowed, Divorced, Separated 0,88 0,61 0,84 0,85 ns 0,87 ns  0,86 0,98 ns 0,88 ns 0,95 ns 0,96 ns 1,10 1,14 0,86 ns 1,13 0,74 
Single  0,83 0,69 0,98 ns 1,11 ns 0,76  0,88 0,83 ns 0,90 ns 0,87 0,65 0,74 0,82 0,86 0,83 0,78 
Married (ref)                 
Education                  
Primary  0,66 0,63 0,52 0,45 0,49  0,54 0,52 0,66 0,56 0,42 0,45 0,62 0,59 0,61 0,54 
Secondary  0,87 0,83 0,79 0,74 0,73  0,74 0,72 0,81 0,80 0,62 0,68 0,72 0,66 0,72 0,69 
Tertiary 
(ref)                  
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Table A5: Transitions from Unemployment to Inactivity 
 
  DK DK SE SE NO NO FI FI ES ES IT IT GR GR PT PT 
  2000-07 2008-09 2000-07 2008-09 2000-07 2008-09 2000-07 2008-09 2000-07 2008-09 2000-07 2008-09 2000-07 2008-09 2000-07 2008-09 
Gender                  
Male  0,72 0,57 0,73 0,67 0,52  0,64 0,81 ns 0,66 0,56 0,50 0,34 0,74 0,83 0,43 0,49 
Female (ref)                 
Age                  
16-24  4,96 5,28 4,24 3,69 3,22  6,69 6,17 0,98 ns 0,79 1,70 1,06 ns 2,11 2,41 2,86 2,60 
25-34  3,27 1,86 2,26 2,50 1,27 ns  2,60 2,10 1,24 0,74 0,96 ns 0,86 0,89 ns 0,88 ns 1,42 1,75 
35-44  1,76 1,30 ns 1,42 1,56 0,76 ns  1,33 1,69 1,24 0,80 0,89 0,85 0,69 0,54 1,13 ns 1,28 ns 
55-63  2,80 3,33 1,09 ns 1,65 1,04 ns  1,86 2,72 1,87 1,86 1,84 2,09 2,18 2,09 1,42 2,32 
45-54 (ref)                  
Marital Status                 
Widowed, Divorced 0,92 ns 0,91 ns 0,81 0,90 ns 0,96 ns  0,88 0,87 ns 0,61 0,81 0,68 0,57 0,44 0,66 0,84 ns 0,69 
Single  0,80 0,79 ns 0,79 0,77 1,18 ns  0,80 0,75 ns 0,59 0,87 ns 0,52 0,53 0,41 0,47 0,91 ns 0,92 ns 
Married (ref)                 
Education                  
Primary  1,41 1,14 ns 1,03 ns 0,83 1,14 ns  0,79 0,99 ns 1,38 0,91 ns 0,69 0,64 1,45 0,86 ns 1,41 1,12 ns 
Secondary  1,40 1,21 ns 1,08 ns 1,01 ns 1,00 ns  0,96 ns 0,84 ns 1,29 0,89 ns 0,86 0,83 1,10 ns 0,78 1,31 1,18 ns 
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Table A6: Transitions from Inactivity to Employment 
 
  DK DK SE SE NO NO FI FI ES ES IT IT GR GR PT PT 
  
2000-
07 
2008-
09 
2000-
07 
2008-
09 
2000-
07 
2008-
09 
2000-
07 
2008-
09 
2000-
07 
2008-
09 
2000-
07 
2008-
09 
2000-
07 
2008-
09 
2000-
07 
2008-
09 
Gender                  
Male  1,04 ns 1,06 ns 1,04 ns 1,06 0,96 ns  1,13 1,09 ns 1,25 1,03 ns 2,66 1,70 1,95 1,80 1,79 1,52 
Female (ref)  . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . 
Age                  
16-24  3,33 3,39 2,10 2,77 6,27  2,63 1,98 2,61 2,00 1,17 1,39 4,50 3,21 6,81 6,28 
25-34  3,91 4,23 2,52 3,68 4,72  3,57 2,67 4,31 3,68 2,20 2,50 6,23 5,00 7,61 7,83 
35-44  2,59 2,51 2,19 2,85 1,98  2,77 2,59 2,07 1,88 2,13 2,02 2,59 2,65 2,84 2,97 
55-63  0,07 0,07 0,27 0,30 0,39  0,10 0,15 0,27 0,30 0,15 0,26 0,30 0,31 0,17 0,15 
45-54 (ref)  . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . 
Marital Status                 
Widowed, Divorced, Separated 0,88 ns 0,94 ns 0,82 0,74 1,04 ns  0,92 ns 0,72 1,71 1,87 1,52 1,57 2,60 1,67 1,11 ns 1,04 ns 
Single  0,81 0,74 0,90 0,81 1,02 ns  0,85 0,72 1,16 1,15 0,81 0,97 ns 1,20 1,39 0,49 0,41 
Married 
(ref)        . . . . . . . . . . 
Education                  
Primary  0,16 0,12 0,28 0,19 0,34  0,12 0,10 0,30 0,29 0,15 0,15 0,08 0,09 0,11 0,11 
Secondary  0,51 0,57 0,71 0,56 0,57  0,50 0,60 0,41 0,45 0,33 0,43 0,19 0,18 0,11 0,15 
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Table A7: Transitions from Inactivity to Unemployment 
 
  DK DK SE SE NO NO FI FI ES ES IT IT GR GR PT PT 
  
2000-
07 
2008-
09 
2000-
07 
2008-
09 
2000-
07 
2008-
09 
2000-
07 
2008-
09 
2000-
07 
2008-
09 
2000-
07 
2008-
09 
2000-
07 
2008-
09 
2000-
07 
2008-
09 
Gender                  
Male  0,98 ns 1,18 1,11 1,18 1,26  1,18 1,17 ns 0,84 0,81 1,37 1,31 1,02 ns 1,05 ns 1,78 1,38 
Female (ref)                  
Age                  
16-24  1,38 1,72 1,01 ns 2,32 5,40  1,31 0,68 1,74 2,12 2,37 1,72 4,26 3,29 1,04 ns 1,10 ns 
25-34  2,97 2,65 1,72 2,49 4,06  2,20 1,38 ns 3,11 3,72 3,52 2,41 6,02 5,24 2,59 2,98 
35-44  2,31 2,78 1,71 1,91 2,50  2,17 1,79 1,73 2,10 2,50 2,11 3,10 2,25 1,44 1,78 
55-63  0,15 0,13 0,31 0,19 0,17  0,11 0,28 0,21 0,25 0,15 0,13 0,19 0,13 0,55 0,43 
45-54 (ref)                  
Marital Status                 
Widowed, Divorced, Separated 1,01 ns 1,06 ns 1,11 ns 1,04 ns 1,41  1,36 1,81 1,71 1,56 2,19 1,81 3,12 2,24 1,20 1,42 
Single  0,90 ns 1,01 ns 0,89 ns 0,68 1,09 ns  0,98 ns 0,91 ns 1,07 ns 0,94 ns 1,42 1,28 1,59 1,95 0,55 0,54 
Married 
(ref)                  
Education                  
Primary  0,25 0,22 0,80 0,72 0,62  0,35 0,55 0,49 0,63 0,12 0,18 0,07 0,06 0,34 0,33 
Secondary  0,46 0,61 1,51 1,00 ns 0,69  0,79 1,15 ns 0,53 0,64 0,26 0,43 0,18 0,14 0,22 0,27 
 
 
